An asymmetric job auction model


  • Xiaoting Wang Department of Economics Acadia University



Heterogeneity, Job auction, Steady state equilibrium.


In this paper we investigate a labor market with search frictions. Workers with heterogeneous productivity apply to different types of job vacancies by bidding the optimal profits that they can offer the firms. In the steady state equilibrium, the most capable workers separate themselves by only bidding at jobs requiring high skills, while applicants in the middle of the productivity distribution pool with the low-productivity workers and apply for jobs requiring low skills.


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